

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

Dec/p

6 September 1960

Copy No. C 73


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 5  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 10 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

6 SEPTEMBER 1960

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Secret CPSU letter, reportedly sent to Communist parties throughout world, admits "sharp" differences with Peiping and urges support for Soviet position at international Communist meeting in Moscow in November; recent reports substantiate earlier accounts of departure from China of many Soviet experts. ①


## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Threat to US position in Iran seen in combination of Soviet advances to Tehran and Shah's dissatisfaction with extent of US aid and support. ②

Special UN representative in Jordan convinced of UAR complicity in Majalli assassination; UAR and Jordan continue vitriolic exchanges. ③

Phoumi, dissatisfied with Souvanna Phouma and course of events in Laos, reportedly planning new military action. ④

Japan's cancellation of visit of Dutch aircraft carrier provokes bitter reaction in The Hague; return of carrier to West. ⑤  
New Guinea will aid Sukarno to obscure domestic crisis.



## III. THE WEST

⑥ Cuban officials reported backing plans of Venezuelan leftist for coup attempt against Betancourt.

⑦ Trujillo's son "Ramfis," now in Europe, probably has established contacts with Soviet bloc; Dominican press and radio increasingly anti-US, pro-Castro, pro-USSR.

## LATE ITEM

⑧ President Kasavubu attempts coup d'etat against Premier Lumumba.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

6 September 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

SI RAB

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR - Communist China: [The Soviet Communist party in late August sent a secret letter to the Indian Communist party--and apparently sent similar letters to Communist parties throughout the world--calling for support of the Soviet position at the forthcoming international Communist conclave at Moscow in November. The letter to the Indian party, a formal and sober appraisal of admitted "sharp" differences with Peiping, firmly repeats Moscow's views regarding the disputed questions of "peaceful coexistence" and the policy to be followed by bloc countries and local Communists toward the non-Communist governments and leaders in underdeveloped countries. Strongly asserting Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement and Soviet primacy in interpreting doctrine, the letter declared that Peiping's policies are hampering the cause of Communism "in more than one way" and that Chinese "dogmatism" is actually aiding imperialism. While placing great stress on unity, Moscow is bidding for the support of all other parties as part of its effort to isolate the Chinese Communist leaders and to force them to back down before or during the November meeting.] (Page 1)

OK

[ ] Peiping, substantiate earlier accounts of the sudden departure of Soviet experts from China. Although there is no information on the precise scale of the movement, [ ] estimates that from half to two thirds of all Soviet technicians in China have left. It remains uncertain whether the initiative for their departure came from Moscow or Peiping.]

no

(Page 4)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iran: [The combination of Soviet advances to Tehran and the Shah's continuing dissatisfaction with the extent of American aid and support, especially in the military field, is posing a threat to the United States' position in Iran, according to Ambassador Wailes. The ambassador fears that the Shah, in an effort to regain lost prestige, has "opened doors which may be difficult to close" and which can lead to a weakening of Iran's internal stability. Meanwhile,] the new, nonpartisan cabinet of Prime Minister Sharif Emami "certainly seems no better than the last." [redacted] 200

(Page 6)

UAR-Jordan: [Vitriolic exchanges between Cairo and Amman are keeping tensions high following the 29 August assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli. The UAR shows no intention of complying with King Husayn's demand for the extradition from Syria of the Jordanians allegedly involved in the killing. The special UN representative in Amman is personally convinced of UAR complicity, and UN Secretary General Hammarskjold is likely to urge Nasir to take steps to calm the situation.] [redacted] 200

The Jordanian Government, previously reported as giving financial support to a Syrian group planning a coup in Syria, now is in touch with a Jordanian in Beirut who has stated his readiness to assassinate Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj and another high-ranking Syrian intelligence figure. [redacted]

Laos: [General Phoumi is bitter over the course of events in Laos and appears to be considering military action of some kind against the newly invested Souvanna Phouma government. Phoumi] [redacted] made threats at his headquarters in Savannakhet on 2 September to divide Laos in two. According to Phoumi, his compromise settlement with Souvanna Phouma was only to gain time, and if he returned to Vientiane, [redacted] 200

6 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

he would have no choice but to "uphold Souvanna Phouma's policy of making Laos red."

\*The clandestine Pathet Lao radio, meanwhile, has responded to Souvanna Phouma's proposal to negotiate, stating that although the Pathet Lao movement welcomes this proposal, it demands the immediate removal of the "Phoumi clique" from the government, an immediate halt to the civil war, and diplomatic recognition of bloc countries. (Page 7)

\*Indonesia - Netherlands - Japan: Japan's decision on 3 September to cancel the visit of the Dutch aircraft carrier Karel Doorman to Yokohama, as the result of Indonesian pressures, has provoked a bitter reaction in The Hague. Foreign Minister Luns is considering withdrawing the Dutch ambassador from Tokyo but not breaking relations with Japan. The Karel Doorman, already en route to Japan when the visit was canceled, is returning to West New Guinea before departing on 17 September for Noumea, New Caledonia. Its return to New Guinea, an area which Indonesia claims, will undoubtedly be exploited by President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist party to stimulate further anti-Dutch feeling and demands for the "liberation" of West New Guinea. Sukarno is particularly eager for a national unifying issue which he can use to obscure the current domestic crisis precipitated by the army's ban of Communist activities in several areas.

### III. THE WEST

#### Venezuela-Cuba:

Fabricio Ojeda, a leftist Venezuelan political leader who has spent considerable time in Cuba since late 1959, is planning a coup attempt in Venezuela with the support of Cuban officials. The move may be timed to exploit the current pro-Castro agitation in Venezuela following the recent OAS foreign ministers' meeting. Venezuela has more private US

6 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

investment than any other Latin American country, and is currently a target of Castro's anti-US revolutionary program in the area. [redacted] (Page 8)

[redacted] Dominican Republic: [General "Ramfis" Trujillo, the Dominican dictator's son who is now in Europe, has almost certainly established contacts with the Soviet bloc.] Anti-US, pro-Cuban, and pro-Soviet tirades are being continued in the government-controlled Dominican press and radiobroadcasts. An extensive propaganda campaign has been preparing the public for the dictator's resumption of the Presidency. [The US Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo fears the Dominican leader will kill many dissidents who belong to a coalition led by pro-US moderates.] *ms*

[redacted] (Page 9)

### LATE ITEM

\*Congo Situation as of 0330 EDT: The pro-Western opposition to Premier Lumumba staged a coup d'etat on 5 September. However, Lumumba is still at liberty and his radio appeal for popular support may have jeopardized the success of the coup. President Kasavubu, perhaps with UN backing, exercised his constitutional powers and replaced Lumumba with able Senate president Joseph Ileo. Soon afterward, Lumumba brushed aside a UN guard at the radio station and broadcast an appeal to the Congolese people in which he announced the removal of Kasavubu from office. It seems unlikely that Lumumba will bow before Kasavubu's legal powers, and the winner may be decided by the support of the Force Publique units in the Leopoldville area. General Kittani of the UN forces is believed to have the situation in hand at Camp Leopold II-- location of the majority of the Force Publique in Leopoldville province. The UN is in control of the camp's supply of arms and ammunition. There were no immediate disorders reported in the capital. [redacted] *ms*

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has confirmed that the Soviet IL-14s which arrived in Stanleyville last week with overt cargoes of food and spare parts, also carried heavy boxes which he suspects contained disassembled machine guns. The fact that

6 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

iv

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

the five Soviet AN-12 turboprop transports now enroute to Stanleyville by-passed Athens and possible inspection by the Greek government there suggests that quantities of Soviet military material are on the way to Lumumba. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Page 11)

6 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

v

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~

## Moscow Rallies World Communist Support in Dispute With Peiping

[The Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in late August dispatched a secret letter to the Indian Communist party--and apparently to Communist parties throughout the world--calling on its leaders to support the Soviet position at the forthcoming international Communist conclave which is scheduled to be held in Moscow in November during the Bolshevik revolution anniversary celebrations. ]

[ ] being circulated on a limited basis among top Indian Communists.]

[The letter contains a formal and sober appraisal of admitted "sharp and strong" differences with Peiping. Forcefully asserting the leadership of the USSR and Soviet primacy in interpreting doctrine, the letter states that there cannot be two different opinions on the matter of coordination between Communist parties, especially the CPSU and the Chinese Communist party (CCP), nor can there be two opinions on interpreting policy in "a dogmatic manner." ]

[The letter reiterates the views, embodied in the foreign policy line of Khrushchev which has been under fire from Peiping, regarding the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West and the tactics to be followed by bloc regimes and local Communists toward non-Communist governments and leaders of underdeveloped countries. It declares that Marxism must be adapted to the changing world situation, specifically in a situation in which the bloc is militarily and politically stronger than the West and the West is effectively deterred from war. The Chinese have consistently charged that Moscow underrates the West's preparations for eventual war, and that in any case there are and will be local wars.]

[The Soviet letter states that, in order to defeat imperialism, the bloc must win over the uncommitted countries which will "rally around" the bloc if it follows a policy of "peaceful coexistence" accompanied by economic aid. Soviet policy is pictured as having already won great support in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while Chinese prestige is declared to be "suffering." Peiping, by magnifying "minor issues"--apparently its disputes with India over the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[border and with Indonesia over the Chinese residents there--is accused of hampering the cause of Communism "in more than one way."]

[The CPSU also answers Chinese charges, [redacted] that the USSR's personnel cuts in its armed forces have thrown away military superiority over the West. The letter asserts that on the contrary, through technological achievements, the USSR is the "strongest citadel of the world Communist movement." The letter also remarks that Soviet leaders have "no illusions" that their current tactical approach will automatically result in a victory for Communism, and that it is Soviet policy to give "maximum possible support" to local Communist parties and to strengthen such "struggle" devices as Communist underground apparatuses.]

[The letter finally declares that, in the interest of the world Communist cause, Sino-Soviet differences should not be "publicly fanned" and that the bloc is helping the West by showing discord based on "sheer dogmatism." The "first opportunity," according to the letter, to resolve these differences will come at the bloc conclave in November, and in the meantime the letter will give the other parties a basis for deliberation.]

[This letter is not the first Soviet attempt to bring the Chinese into line. On the eve of the Bucharest conference in June, the CPSU circulated a long document to the world Communist parties severely criticizing Chinese policies and tactics. While virtually all of the parties represented at Bucharest supported the Soviet line, the Chinese at the conference held firm, and in fact attacked Khrushchev as a "revisionist." Since Bucharest, the nominal appearance of unity embodied in the agreement finally signed there has broken down completely and the CPSU has been on the offensive against the Chinese.)

[The Soviet and East European representation at the forthcoming UN General Assembly appears designed to emphasize Communist China's isolation and demonstrate satellite party support for the CPSU. The Ukrainian and Belorussian delegations and the delegations of all the East European members of the UN, except Albania, will be headed by their respective party chiefs, rather]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[than governmental figures as is the normal practice. Khrushchev, as head of the USSR's delegation, can be expected to underscore his commitment to a policy of peaceful coexistence and high-level negotiations.]

[Despite these signs of Soviet pressure on Peiping, it seems clear that Moscow does not expect the November meeting to do more than paper over the Sino-Soviet dispute. The forthcoming meeting, however, would enable the USSR to make clear the virtual isolation of the CCP, which can already conclude from the world Communist press that its views do not command much support. It is questionable, in fact, whether the Chinese would again be willing to attend a meeting called for the purpose of subjecting them to party discipline.]

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~Status Report on Soviet Technicians Leaving China

[redacted] un-  
usually large numbers of Soviet technicians have been leaving  
China for the USSR and that their departure has been sudden.  
Although the scale of the movement is uncertain, [redacted]  
[redacted] estimates that one half to two thirds of all  
Soviet technicians in China are involved. [redacted]  
departures were continuing as of late August and that security  
arrangements set up by the Chinese at the Peiping railway sta-  
tion to screen the departing Soviet personnel from observation  
were still in force, though not particularly effective. [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] There are [also] a number of suggestions [redacted]  
[redacted] that a considerable number of Soviet technicians have  
departed. The continuing presence of others is confirmed. Only  
[redacted] payment for the maintenance of  
a specialist [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] the reassign-  
ment of some Soviet experts was unanticipated; among a number of  
such indications, one cites the "hurried return" of a Soviet national  
to the USSR and another inquires about the personal effects of the  
"comrades who left on leave and did not return." [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] the status of specialists in China from the European satellites  
may also have been affected. [redacted] owing to the  
present situation in China" there was no need for the arrival of a  
specialist to coordinate the delivery of Polish equipment.  
[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] the departure date of the "factory specialists" and the "machine export representative." [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] [Both the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties are reported to have threatened to take such action as might result in the technicians' departure, but the sequence of events leading to their departure remains unknown.] [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~Uneasy Situation Continues in Iran

Iran may move toward neutrality, accompanied by a softening of its policies toward the Soviet Union, unless a special effort is made to keep Iran in the Western camp, according to Ambassador Wailes. The ambassador recently expressed "deep concern" over the threat posed by the combination of Soviet advances to the Iranian Government and the Shah's continuing dissatisfaction over the extent of American aid, especially in the military field.)

Wailes has also expressed a "distinct sense of uneasiness" over the domestic situation in Iran. He fears that the Shah, in an effort to regain personal prestige, has opened doors "which may be difficult to close." Nationalist and independent elements apparently are trying to exploit the cancellation of the recent elections and the promise of new elections. At least one major demonstration has been attempted but was dispersed by the police while the army was in readiness.)

The committee to amend the electoral law held its first meeting at the palace on 3 September. The Shah, however, still faces the problem of achieving a compliant National Assembly while maintaining the semblance of free elections. The appointment of General Alavi-Moqadam, chief of the National Police, as minister of interior suggests that an attempt will be made to conduct orderly but controlled elections. Alavi-Moqadam has the reputation of being a tough policeman and is regarded as the counterweight to the power of intelligence (SAVAK) chief Bakhtiar. No date has yet been set for the new elections and the longer the delay the greater the danger of antiregime demonstrations. There will be increased danger of trouble from the volatile students if the elections are held while Tehran University and other schools are in session.

The cabinet of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami is about as unimpressive as its predecessor under Eqbal. Six of the 15 appointees were ministers in Eqbal's cabinet. The new foreign minister is 61-year-old Yadollah Azodi. Azodi is a career diplomat of long standing and is cautiously regarded as pro-American.) His ill health and retirement status suggest his appointment is an interim choice and should end, for the time being at least, persistent rumors that Masud-Ansari, Iranian ambassador to the USSR, would be named foreign minister as an important step toward improving relations with the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Laos

[General Phoumi apparently has grown increasingly bitter over the train of events in Laos and is considering possible courses of action to redress the situation. Phoumi shows no intention of making an early return to Vientiane from his headquarters in Savannakhet to participate in the newly invested Souvanna Phouma government. He is reliably reported to have stated that he may attempt to break southern Laos away from the Souvanna regime and has hinted that he might try to annex his area to Thailand. There is historical precedent in the existence until 1946 of a kingdom of southern Laos.]

[Phoumi who also has talked vaguely of plans for a counter-coup, apparently is convinced that Souvanna Phouma's policies are tantamount to turning Laos over to the Communists. His fears for his safety in Vientiane so long as Kong Le remains in a position of power have some justification. Phoumi is also aware of rumors of Pathet Lao plans to apprehend or assassinate him and other members of his faction.]

[The Pathet Lao meanwhile have responded to Souvanna Phouma's offers to negotiate by setting "minimum conditions" for such talks. The terms, as broadcast over the clandestine Pathet Lao radio, include the immediate removal of the "Phoumi clique" from the government, a cessation of fighting, diplomatic recognition by Laos of all countries having "different social and political systems," and the acceptance of these countries' economic assistance.]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Possible Cuban Involvement in Subversive Activity in Venezuela

Fabricio Ojeda, a leftist Venezuelan political leader who has spent considerable time in Cuba since late 1959, is organizing a coup attempt against President Betancourt's coalition with the support of Cuban officials, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Cuba reportedly has arranged to supply arms and training facilities for Venezuelans. The move may be timed to exploit the current political tension in Venezuela and the threat to the coalition arising from Foreign Minister Arcaya's refusal--in opposition to his government's policy--to sign the resolution adopted by the OAS foreign ministers in San Jose against extracontinental intervention in the hemisphere. A series of pro-Castro demonstrations have already erupted in Venezuela apparently in support of Arcaya, who, like Ojeda, is a member of the Democratic Republican Union, a staunch pro-Castro party which is a dissatisfied component of the coalition.

Venezuela, which has the largest US investment--about three billion dollars--of any Latin American country and has a large leftist element, is a logical target of Castro's anti-US program in the area. Castro has maintained close liaison with a large number of Venezuelan dissident leaders--including Communists and the Marxist element which defected from Betancourt's own Democratic Action party--possibly with the ultimate objective of overthrowing Betancourt, who is hostile toward him. A Cuban national, favorable to the Cuban regime, recently informed a US official that Castro had sponsored in early 1960 a paramilitary training program for Venezuelan leftists who are to play a role in a future move against Betancourt. A prominent Venezuelan newsman recently wrote that Castro was bribing Venezuelan journalists and organizing "a powerful army within Venezuela" to promote a Castro-style coup. Betancourt's press secretary advised the US Embassy in Caracas in August that a top Venezuelan Communist had received \$500,000 from Cuba to convert the party's weekly paper into a daily. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~Trujillo Probably Seeking Contacts with Communist Bloc

[General "Ramfis" Trujillo, the Dominican dictator's son who is in Europe, has almost certainly made contacts with the Soviet bloc. He reportedly has been given broad authority to negotiate commercial and political agreements with European and Soviet bloc countries.]

The regime-controlled radio and press have become increasingly pro-Cuban, pro-USSR, and bitterly anti-American. Since 25 August, Radio Caribe which reportedly is owned by the Trujillo family has been using items attributed to TASS. Radio Caribe complained that the homes occupied by diplomats of those countries that have broken diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic "need to be fumigated and left ready for more pleasing diplomats--and these could be even those from the lands of the Mandarins." The radio announced on 25 August that negotiations were under way to procure the services of the Chinese Communists' New China News Agency.

Trujillo may soon resume the office of President in response to "popular demand." In order to maintain a facade of legality, the puppet President Balaguer, who already has asked Trujillo to replace him, may appoint Trujillo secretary of state for the armed forces--the next in line in the succession to the presidency--before resigning from office.

The US Embassy reported on 25 August--the day before diplomatic relations were broken and the embassy reduced to a consulate--that a coalition of anti-Trujillo opponents led by pro-US moderates and extending from university students on the left to top-level military officers on the right was being formed. There is a danger that Trujillo may attempt to liquidate all suspected dissidents before the coalition has an opportunity to act. Recent

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

reports suggest that the number of Trujillo-directed assassinations has been on the rise.

[ ] The US air attaché had reports on 26 August that government troops supported by tanks were concentrating against an insurgent force forming in the hills near San Jose de Ocoa where anti-Trujillo dissidence has been strong. [ ]

[ ]

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]\*Situation in the Congo as of 0330 EDT

[The pro-Western opposition to Premier Lumumba staged a coup d'etat on 5 September. However, Lumumba is still at liberty and his radio appeal for popular support may have placed the success of the coup in jeopardy. President Kasavubu exercised his constitutional powers and replaced Lumumba with Joseph Ileo, the moderate president of the Congolese Senate. However, within an hour, Lumumba had brushed aside a UN guard at the radio station and broadcast a general appeal for support. He also announced his removal of Kasavubu from office. UN involvement in the coup is suggested by the remarks of a British officer commanding a unit of Ghanaian UN troops, "I had instructions to stop him speaking at all costs. But I could not do so without shooting him.")

[Lumumba, who has been getting increased technical and material support from the Communist bloc, is not likely to bow before Kasavubu's legal powers. The winner may be decided on the basis of who can gain the support of Force Publique units near Leopoldville. Lumumba has generally had the support of this group but General Kittani of the UN command is believed to have the situation in hand at Camp Leopold II--location of the majority of the Force Publique in Leopoldville province. The UN is reportedly in control of the base's supply of arms and ammunition. The populace of Leopoldville may give considerable backing to Kasavubu and the moderate opposition because of tribal considerations. There were no immediate disorders reported in the capital.] [REDACTED]

[UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has stated that the 10 Soviet IL-14s which arrived in Stanleyville last week carried some heavy boxes which he suspects contained disassembled machine guns in addition to overt cargoes of food and spare parts for the planes placed at Lumumba's disposal. Hammarskjold said that he "did not understand what had happened to Greek inspection" when the planes transited Athens.] [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[The fact that the five Soviet AN-12 turboprop transports now en-route to Stanleyville bypassed Athens and inspection by the Greek Government strongly implies that larger quantities of Soviet materiel are on the way to Lumumba.] [redacted]

[redacted] the UN command is seeking to obtain control over all traffic in and out of the most important airports in the Congo. [redacted] the UN would not intervene were Lumumba to load troops on aircraft at Leopoldville but would oppose the landing of such troops in Elisabethville or elsewhere in Katanga. On the other hand, the UN would not permit Katanga Premier Moise Tshombé to damage airports in Katanga.] [redacted]

[The Secretary General anticipates further serious trouble with the Congolese Government over the visit by Premier Tshombé, accompanied by 50 gendarmes, to the Kamina base now under UN control. He anticipates that Lumumba may demand that the base be turned over to the central government. The Secretary General is also concerned with the problem of UN communications--telephone communications being no longer possible or desirable and cable messages being delayed.] [redacted]

[Press reports indicate that fierce fighting around Bakwanga, the capital of the secessionist "Mining State" in Kasai province, has spread to surrounding villages. Apparently over 400 persons have been killed in a resort to savagery. Ten Soviet IL-14 planes reportedly have landed in Kasai province with 200 reinforcements for Lumumba's forces at Bakwanga; the secessionists are being strengthened by 250 volunteers from Baluba tribesmen of Katanga province.] [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~